The main result of the paper is a constructive proof of the following equivalence: two pure -terms are observationally equivalent in the lazy concurrent -calculus i they have the same L evy-Longo trees. An algorithm which allows to build a context discriminating any two pure -terms with di erent L evy-Longo trees is described. It follows that contextual equivalence coincides with behavioural equivalence (bisimulation) as considered by Sangiorgi. Another consequence is that the discriminating power of concurrent lambda contexts is the same as that of Boudol-Laneve's contexts with multiplicities.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of what is the \meaning" of a term in the lazy -calculus. To explain our result let us begin with the following few observations borrowed from the paper 2] of Abramsky and Ong.
In the ordinary -calculus, the most natural understanding of evaluation to a \value" is reduction to a normal form. It is however well-known that this interpretation cannot be taken as a basis of a consistent equational theory. Indeed, equating all -terms without normal forms results in equating everything: x:xN = x:xM must hold for each M; N (see 7, p .39]), where ( x:xx)( x:xx).
One can consider head normal forms instead, obtaining a consistent theory, which equates unsolvable terms. The \meaning" of a -term is then understood as its equiva- The reader is referred to 2] for a discussion why this understanding of a \meaning" is not satisfactory when -calculus is meant to be used as a prototypical functional language. In short, a lazy language may evaluate an expressions to a \prompt" (an abstraction) rather than to a head normal form. This is better represented by assuming that any abstraction is a \value". This idea gives rise to the lazy -calculus. The lazy -calculus is a type free calculus, with the same syntax as pure -calculus and a reduction relation over closed terms, with just two rules: Clearly, the structure of lazy -calculus is ner than that of the \standard theory". Terms like and x: are now distinguished, and the contextual equivalence has smaller equivalence classes. Thus, obviously, B ohm trees are no longer adequate to describe the \meaning" of -terms.
Here comes the idea of a re nement of the B ohm tree approach for the lazy evaluation: the L evy-Longo trees. Indeed Longo 24] and Ong 27, 28] prove that L evy-Longo trees characterize the -theory of the lazy Plotkin-Scott-Engeler models. These trees were introduced by Longo in 24] following ideas of L evy 23].
The L evy-Longo trees are de ned in a similar way to B ohm trees with the following modi cations. First is that one distinguishes between ? and x 1 : : :x n :?, for all n. In addition, there is a new symbol > used to represent an \in nite lambda abstraction" obtained when a term can be reduced to weak head normal forms x 1 : : :x n :M n , for all n and suitable M n . (An example of such a term is ( xy:xx)( xy:xx).) The L evy-Longo tree of a term M is denoted by LL(M).
It should be clear that equality of L evy-Longo trees su ces for contextual equivalence. However, the converse does not hold even for B ohm trees. Take as an example the two terms M x:xx and N x:x( y:xy). We have M N, but BT(M) 6 = BT(N).
We shall however contend that L evy-Longo trees provide an appropriate understanding of the actual \meaning" of a -term with respect to lazy evaluation, even if, as shown by the above example, they are of stronger discriminating power than the ordinary notion of contextual equivalence. This is because the notion of lazy contextual equivalence may change when the lazy -calculus is embedded into a richer language. Then the ner structure of lazy -terms becomes visible in the extended contexts.
As noticed in 33], this is interesting mainly when we add parallel and non-deterministic features to the lazy -calculus, in view of the integration between functional and concurrent programming languages. We want to know when a functional procedure can replace another one leaving unchanged the observable behaviour of a process which uses it.
Notice that an equivalence ner than that induced by L evy-Longo trees seems unreasonable. In fact 33] proves that enriching the lazy -calculus with well-formed operators (w.r.t. a natural de nition inspired by 22]) we never distinguish -terms with the same L evy-Longo tree.
In the literature we can nd essentially two di erent scenarios which induce the same equivalence relation on pure -terms as L evy-Longo trees.
In 33], Sangiorgi considers the embedding of lazy -calculus in some concurrent calculi. First, Milner's encoding of lazy -calculus in -calculus is studied. A (slight variant of) this encoding gives rise to a -calculus model whose theory is again that of L evy-Longo trees 34]. Then the lazy -calculus is enriched with a simple non-deterministic operator, which, when applied to an argument, either gives the argument itself or diverges. In both cases the processes are compared using bisimulation. So we can conclude that \non-determinism + bisimulation" has the discriminating power of L evy-Longo trees.
On the other side, Boudol and Laneve 12] introduce a \resource conscious" re nement of -calculus, in which every argument comes with a multiplicity. The reduction process (which uses explicit substitution in an essential way) remains deterministic, but a deadlock can appear. The terms are compared by means of the standard observational equivalence. The result is that also \deadlock + observational equivalence" discriminate as L evy-Longo trees. Notably Boudol and Laneve use in 11] the -calculus of multiplicities to show that the preorder on terms induced by the encoding in -calculus when processes are compared using may testing coincide with the preorder on terms induced by their L evy-Longo tree representation.
We consider the behaviour of pure -terms inside contexts of the concurrent -calculus as de ned in 18]. This calculus is obtained from the pure -calculus (with call-by-value and call-by-name variables) by adding a non-deterministic choice operator + and a parallel The main technical tool we use is a type assignment system for union and intersection types (see Section 3 for details). Let`denote the derivation in this system. Besides the logic Type _^o f intersection and union types, we will consider also the logic Type^of intersection types only, and the set of type schemes Type^t obtained by adding type variables to Type^. We stress that we are interested in results concerning Type _^a nd that the introduction of the other two languages is only a device for showing these results.
The following theorem is proved in 18].
Theorem 1 ( 18])
For pure -terms M, N, the following conditions are equivalent: Really, Theorems 1 and 2 hold for broader sets of terms. In fact Theorem 1 was stated in 18] for the terms of the concurrent -calculus +k (introduced in Section 4) and we will prove Theorem 2 for the set of terms ?;> obtained adding the constants ?; > to the pure -terms (cf. Section 3). The intersection between +k and ?;> is the set of pure -terms, so we get Corollary 3 for them. Notice that the observation contexts which give us the discriminating power of L evy-Longo trees belong to the concurrent -calculus. Corollary 3 justi es the title of the paper: we can exhibit a discriminating context belonging to the concurrent -calculus whenever we get two pure -terms with di erent L evy-Longo trees.
Hence the third scenario of the same discriminating power as the L evy-Longo trees is \concurrent -calculus + observational equivalence". We want to justify the interest in this third scenario by comparing it with the previous ones.
From one side, observational equivalence seems a more appropriate tool than bisimulation. First, the notion of observational equivalence is simpler: indeed bisimulation amounts to verifying the behaviours of processes at intermediate steps of computation rather than just the input-output relation. Then, as pointed out in 9], there are various notions of bisimulation (see for example 25, 26, 32] ) and there is no consensus on which is the proper one. Notably Sangiorgi proves in 34] that these notions of bisimulation coincide on the sublanguage of -calculus which su ces for encoding lazy -calculus.
On the other side, the -calculus of multiplicities of 12] does not seem of independent interest, while systems similar to the concurrent -calculus have been studied in di erent papers, like 10, 29, 30, 3, 17, 18] .
A last remark is that we give a very simple algorithm for building discriminating contexts. Also the proofs of 32] and 12] are constructive, so they can be used for obtaining discriminating contexts, through suitable variants of the B ohm-out technique 7, Section 10.3].
As a byproduct of our main result we have that the the same category. In spite of this di erence, L evy-Longo trees characterize the -theory of all these models, when we restrict to pure -terms. Notice that in this case the powerdomain semantics uses only singleton sets. We want to stress that we describe a discrimination algorithm. Given two -terms with di erent L evy-Longo trees, we can determine a concurrent context which separates these terms. A proof without explicit construction of a concurrent context was given in 20]. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de ne the intersection and union types Type _^a nd an auxiliary language Type^of intersection types. Section 3 gives the language ?;> , and introduces the type assignment system`. Section 4 contains an introduction to the concurrent -calculus. In Section 5 we de ne L evy-Longo trees and approximants. The latters serve as the main tool in proving the main result of this paper. Section 6 introduces the notion of principal pairs and discusses their properties. The main result of the paper (Theorem 20) and the discrimination algorithm are given in Section 7. We also illustrate there the technique of nding discriminating typings and concurrent contexts for two -terms with di erent L evy-Longo trees. The concluding remarks section discusses the relation with Abramsky-Ong development 2]. The Appendix contains proofs of the auxiliary technical results which are used during the proof of the main theorem of the paper.
Subtype preorders
In this section we de ne the set of types Type _^u sed in our type assignment system, and of a subset Type^of it, and we state some basic properties of the subtype relations we need. We remark that the logic Type _^i s central to our development, while the logic Type^is only useful in some proofs given in the Appendix. In spite of this, we present here both logics since we think the conservativity result (Proposition 4) is of independent interest.
The set Type _^i s de ned by the following grammar:
::= ! j ! j ^ j _ ; and the set Type^is de ned by:
::= ! j ! j ^ :
Clearly Type^ Type _^a nd the inclusion is proper. A notational convention is thatâ nd _ take precedence over !. The relation over Type^is the smallest preorder such that 1. hType^; i is a semi-lattice, in which^is the meet, and ! is the top, i.e. the axioms (A1) through (A4) and rules (R1) and (R2) above axiomatize^and !.
2. the arrow satis es (A8), (A9) and (R4) above.
We will use the symbols ^a nd _^, for subtyping in Type^and Type _^, respectively. 
The last inequality follows from the subtyping axiom (A9).
3 Lambda-terms and type assignment . We need the additional constant > to account for an \in-nite abstraction". It will become clearer after we introduce L evy-Longo trees in Section 5.
In the lazy -calculus ? plays the role of an unsolvable term which never reduces to an abstraction, and therefore it could be replaced by . Analogously, > plays the role of an unsolvable term which reduces to terms with arbitrary numbers of initial abstractions, and therefore it could be replaced by YK. We think that our choice (which is the standard one) is better since it allows to approximate -terms by constants rather than by -terms (cf. Section 5). The symbol denotes the syntactic equality of terms up to renaming of bound variables.
Head normal forms are terms of the form x 1 : : :x n :yM 1 : : :M m , where n; m 0. The variable y is called the head variable of such a head normal form.
On ?;> we consider the reduction rules:
for all x and all M. So by reduction we will mean the contextual, re exive and transitive closure of these rules plus the standard beta rule. By = ?;> we will denote the symmetric closure of this reduction relation. Now we present the de nitions and basic properties of our type assignment system. A basis ? is a partial mapping from term variables to types. We derive assertions ?`M : , where M 2 ?;> , and 2 Type _^, and all types in ? are in Type _^. In the next section we will extend this system to terms of the concurrent -calculus. For that extension the subject reduction property (Theorem 8) is no longer true: this is the reason why we rst consider the present system.
The axioms and rules of our system are the following: The type assignment rules can be \reversed", as stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 6 (Generation Theorem) (1) and (2) is by a routine induction with respect to the size of derivations. Part (3) follows from part (2) and Lemma 5(3). Part (4) is proved again by induction, with Lemma 5(4) used for case (^I).
Following 18], we will use the notation ! n ! , de ned by: ! 0 ! = ; ! n+1 ! = ! ! (! n ! ). We will also use the abbreviation ! n ! ! = ! n .
The types ! n for suitable n are \better than" all other types, as shown in the following Proposition (proved in 18]).
Proposition 7 For all , there exists n such that ! n .
An essential property of the system`is the subject conversion property: types are invariant w.r.t. = ?;> conversion. This property is fairly well-known for ordinary systems with intersection types w.r.t. beta conversion (see e.g. 13]), and can be shown for our system using the same approach. Let us stress here that our system`should not be confused with systems of union types with a \union elimination" rule, cf. e.g. 5], which often do not have even the subject reduction property. As showed in 18], union elimination is unsound for the concurrent -calculus, since the terms of this calculus contain the non-deterministic choice operator (de ned in Section 4). For example in absence of the union elimination rule we cannot derive` xy:xy: ( Proof: For beta equality the proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proof given in 13]. For the conversion rules involving >, notice that ?` x:> : holds for all ?; and x. In fact for a xed by Proposition 7 we can always nd n such that ! n . Now by axiom (>) we can deduce ?`> : ! n , so by rules (! I) and ( ) we are done, since ! n+1 ! n . Moreover ?`>M : for all ?; and M follows from ?`> : ! ! and ?`M : ! using rule (! E).
About ?, notice that only types equivalent to ! can be derived for ? and ?M. Observe that types are not preserved by -reduction. Indeed, we have e.g.` y:xy : ! ! ! but 6 x : ! ! !.
FV (M) stands for the set of free variables of M and 0 +k is the set of terms M such that FV (M) = ;. Moreover, we shall refer to the following set Par = f(MkN) j M; N 2 +k g: We now introduce a reduction relation which is intended to formalize the expected behaviour of a machine which evaluates in a synchronous way parallel compositions, until a value is produced. Partial values can be further evaluated, and this is essential to deal with an application of a call-by-value abstraction. Therefore, in some cases an asynchronous evaluation of parallel composition is permitted.
The reduction relation ?! is the least binary relation over 0 +k such that
We denote by n ?! the n-times self-composition of ?! and by ?! the re exive and transitive closure of ?!. Notice that our reduction is highly non-deterministic, and also very sensitive to counting the number of steps. For example the only reductions of the term: Notice that Theorem 1 is the restriction of Theorem 9 to the case M; N 2 .
L evy-Longo trees and approximants
In this section we consider only terms in ?;> . It is easy to verify that the set of normal forms A ?;> with respect to the reduction relation introduced in Section 3 is the least set satisfying: Recall that a weak head normal form is a head normal form or an abstraction. The The Approximation Theorem allows us to relate the sets of types of a term to the set of its approximants, and therefore to its L evy-Longo tree. The following is the main tool which provides the discriminating power. We defer the proof of this theorem for the Appendix. 
Concluding remarks
The literature related to the present work has mostly been quoted in the Introduction. Here we want to compare our development (based on 18]) with that of 2]. Lastly, there is a di erence in the choice of the language: 2] builds a model for the lazy -calculus, while 18] builds a model for the concurrent -calculus introduced in Section 4. We can compare the local structure of these models by restricting ourselves to pureterms. Let us consider x and y:xy: we have 6 x: ! ! !, while` y:xy: ! ! !. One can prove that, with types in Type^, we get ?` y:xy: whenever ?`x: . Therefore, in the model of 2] the interpretation of x is properly included in that of y:xy. But To sum up, we proved that intersection and union types discriminate as strictly as L evyLongo trees do. Using the results of 18] we can then build a discriminating context in the concurrent -calculus. For the classical -calculus the more common way of comparing terms is to consider their B ohm trees 7, Chapter 10]. So a natural question is what can be added to the pure -calculus in order to give it the discriminating power of B ohm trees. The paper 6] gives a type assignment system in which two -terms have the same types i they have the same B ohm trees. Starting from this result, 16] proves that adding to the pure -calculus a non-deterministic choice operator and an adequate numeral system we obtain a language which internally discriminates two -terms if and only if they have di erent B ohm trees. 3 . ad( ^ ) = max(ad( ); ad( )); 4. ad( _ ) = min(ad( ); ad( )):
We have the following simple lemma.
Lemma 25 If ^_ then ad( ) ad( ).
Proof: The proof is by easy induction w.r.t. the de nition of ^_ .
Our rst goal is to show that in fact Type^has least upper bounds of nite non-empty sets. First let us observe that every element in Type^is either equal to ! (after some obvious normalization) or is of the form We show several properties of this operation. 
t ( ^ ) ^( t )^( t ).
Proof: The proofs of parts (1) and (2) are by induction on ad( ). We prove only (1), the proof of (2) being similar. For ^! or ^! the conclusion is obvious. So take 
where l is j , provided j 2 J, k otherwise, and similar notation for 0 l . The right hand side of (3) 
Now, by formulas (5), (6) This completes the proof. Our next goal is to show that Type^is a retract of Type _^. From this a conservativity result will follow. Let us de ne a function G : Type _^! Type^by induction as follows.
It is clear that G restricted to Type^is identity. Hence, by the next lemma it will follow that G is a retraction. A similar phenomenon occurs for the set T of pure arrow types, i.e., the types of Type^which do contain^. It can be shown, using a de nition of t and u in T by mutual recursion, that T is a lattice with the ordinary subtype preorder. However lub's and glb's in T in general do not coincide with those in Type _^, nor with those in Type^.
A2 Proof of the Approximation Theorem
The Approximation Theorem is proved by means of a variant of Tait's \computability" technique, in the style of 19]. We de ne sets of \approximable" and \computable" terms. The computable terms are de ned by induction on types, and every computable term is shown to be approximable (Lemma 32 (2) (1), we obtain one approximant that has both these types. The remaining cases are easy.
Let us notice that without the last clause of part (e) in the de nition of Comp, Lemma 32 would be false. Consider for example that x: _ `x: _ ; then we get App(fx: _ g; _ ; x) and this implies Comp(fx: _ g; _ ; x) by Lemma 32(1). But we can derive neither x: _ `x: nor x: _ `x: , and therefore App(fx: _ g; ; x) and App(fx: _ g; ; x) are both false. We conclude that also Comp 
()) If > 2 A(M) it is trivial. Otherwise, since App(fx: g; ; x) holds for any variable x and type , then by Lemma 32(1), we have Comp(fx: g; ; x). Thus we can apply Lemma 34 for the identity substitution, to obtain Comp(?; ; M). The hypothesis follows from Lemma 32 (2) .
(() The proof is by induction with respect to ?`A : . Cases (^I), ( ), and (!) are obvious. Case (!I) follows from Lemma 11 (2) , and cases (!E) and (Ax) from Lemma 11 (3) . The most interesting case is when the last applied rule is (>). Now if M = ?;> > it follows by subject conversion (Theorem 8). Otherwise > 2 A(M) implies that M reduces to x 1 : : :x n :Q n for suitable Q n and all n. We have ?` x 1 : : :x n :Q n : ! n for all n, so we conclude ?`M : for all ?; by Proposition 7 and Theorem 8. This completes the proof of (7).
Then also q i = 0, and we actually have i = F( i ; 0) _^ j . Lemma 29 gives us G( i ) _^G ( j ), i.e., The right hand side of the above inequality has only one occurrence of ! 1 and the left hand side has two. To satisfy the inequality, the rst ! 1 must match the occurrence at the right hand side, and the second one must occur not earlier than the h + m + 2-nd argument (to be \covered" by the target !). It follows that h + m + 2 p i + m ? q i + i + n ? 1 p i + m + i + n 2m + 2n, which is a contradiction. Similarly we get that the second possibility is contradictory. We need one more technical lemma for the proof of Theorem 19. Let us recall that the arrowdegree ad(?) is de ned at page 26.
Lemma 37 
